




Improved Routing in QKD Networks

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Motivation - Quantum Threat



Goal is to build a QKD Network as a Platform to distributed quantum-secure symmetrical keys between various sites

* NIST recommendation: 64Gbyte per **AES-256** key invocation according to <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf>

→ example: about 4 seconds lifetime or 64bit/s refresh rate per 100G channel

Problem Definition


- Find a path to forward keys between two access nodes
- Considering two types of constraints:

Resource Utilization:

- Balance the constraints to improve resource utilization
- Taking detours to avoid heavy frequented links or links with lower key rates
- Limiting detours to avoid overload of the network considering the total key consumption
- Latency can be seen as uncritical → keys can be stored

Security aspects:

- Paths must fulfill certain security aspects to ensure secure key forwarding
- Considering the links (keys) and the nodes



Example Topology of a QKD network

Implementation - Path Computation


General assumptions:

- Centralized control architecture
- Online Routing: every request will be routed considering the current state of the network

The challenge is to define a method to implement the detour:


Metrics:

- Secret Key Rate (SKR)
- Emptiness of the Key Store (eks/cap)



Formula:

$$F(SKR, eks) = x * \left(e^{\left(\frac{eks}{cap} * a \right)} + b * \frac{eks}{cap} \right) + (1 - x) * c * \frac{1}{SKR}$$



High Level Architecture according to ETSI 015
(https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/015/02.01.01_60/gs_QKD015v020101p.pdf)

Simulation - Initialization


Data:

- Topology from the SND LIB „nobel-germany“
- Contains: Topology, lengths und demands in relation

Assumptions:


- Split longer edges evenly to reasonable lengths for QKD Modules (about 80 km)
- Realistic secret key rates from the model of a QKD system from HHI*
- Generate a request list for individual key requests based on the demands of the SNDlib
- Uniform sizing of the key storage with the aim of achieving a meaningful simulation duration

*Cooperation in the QuNET+ML Project




SDNLib Nobel-Germany (<http://sndlib.zib.de/home.action>)

Simulation - Procedure



Node A	Node B	Store [Keys]	required rate [Gbit/s]	required keyrate [key/s]	enc_data[Gbit]
Berlin	Bremen	0	600	0	0

Node A		Node B		Requests[Keys]
Berlin		Bremen		1
Berlin		Bremen		1
Berlin		Bremen		1





Node A	Node B	Store [Keys]	required rate [Gbit/s]	required keyrate [key/s]	enc_data[Gbit]
Berlin	Bremen	331	600	2,366906	84000

Simulation - Results

Formula:




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Simulation - Results

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
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Simulation - Results

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Summary:

- Our simple adapted link metric allows persistent use of Dijkstra without draining individual buffers. It also supports load-balancing as each single key demand is optimally routed.
- “Emptiness” of key buffer is crucial, SKR is only implicitly relevant.

→ Result: $M_{opt} = a^E$ with $b=0$; $c=0$



OUR MISSION

WE BUILD UP THE QUANTUM SECURITY OF THE FUTURE

Acknowledgements:



QuNET⁺
ML