Operational communication in a constitutional state: Achieving success through legality and consistent credibility

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which violated international law, the information space itself has become a military domain. Social media, disinformation, AI-generated content, and targeted influence campaigns shape modern conflicts – often below the threshold of open warfare. How does the German Armed Forces define “operational communication” today? Where is the line between legitimate influence and manipulation? And how can military communications work be reconciled with democratic values, the rule of law, and ethical standards – especially in competition with authoritarian systems? What role do AI and other new digital possibilities play? What about Russia?

Markus B. Jaeger, Head of VDE Defense and Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve, recently discussed these and other topics with Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin. Jaeger and Akaltin met at the Handelsblatt conference “Security & Defense” in Berlin in January 2026. At the time of the conversation, Colonel Dr. Akaltin was still commander of the German Armed Forces Operational Communications Center (ZOpKomBw). Colonel Dr. Akaltin handed over command of the ZOpKomBw to his successor shortly before this interview was published.

Dr. Ferdi Akaltin, who holds a doctorate in history, had been commander of ZOpKomBw, a Bundeswehr agency for operational communications in the information space, since mid-2021. The center is part of the Cyber and Information Space Command. Its task is to analyze the information environment, detect disinformation, and use approved information measures to support military leadership. After completing the General Staff Course in Germany and a further course in Denmark, Colonel Dr. Akaltin held various military positions, including battalion commander, chief of staff of a tank brigade, and head of department at NATO headquarters LANDCOM in Izmir (Turkey).

Colonel Dr. Akaltin – first of all, thank you very much for taking the time to talk to VDE Defense in the midst of the challenging handover of command. Let's start with a look at the history of operational communications. In ancient times, operational communications on the battlefield were visible and audible. Banners, imposing uniforms, marching orders, and drums were intended to have a psychological effect on the enemy: intimidation and demoralization. During the Cold War, information was seen as a weapon. Terms such as “psychological operations – PSYOPS” and “minds and hearts” defined the approach. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which violated international law, the digital information space has also become more of a battlefield and an independent military domain. How do you define “operational communication” today, and what role does the Bundeswehr's Center for Operational Communication play in this context? In your opinion, what is often misunderstood about the term “operational communication,” and how does the Bundeswehr's operational communication differ from classic strategic communication? Where do you draw the line between information, influence, and manipulation?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: Operational communication opens up the information environment as a military theater of operations. The Bundeswehr Operational Communication Center combines the capabilities for conducting information operations and psychological operations. These capabilities are a central part of our state's strategic communication – StratCom – which also includes the Bundeswehr's public relations work and civil-military cooperation. The aim of this comprehensive StratCom approach is to coherently align all actions and related communication with political and military objectives in the event of conflict. The line between information, influence and manipulation is often blurred. Information conveys truthful facts with the aim – as the term implies – of providing purely factual and objective information. Information therefore does not involve any intention to steer opinion. Influence also uses true content, but with the intention of influencing and changing attitudes or behavior. Manipulation, on the other hand, occurs when content or intentions are obscured, thereby deliberately impairing the free formation of opinion.

In our Western democracies, we uphold an almost identical set of values based on ethical and democratic roots. Anyone who looks at the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine and the treatment of critical voices in their own country will quickly realize that those responsible in Moscow, who are behind these massacres, terrorist attacks on the Ukrainian civilian population, and purges in their own country, have anything but the values we live by in Germany and Europe in mind. Ethics and democratic structures are nowhere to be found there. How does the Bundeswehr ensure that operational communication remains compatible with democratic values, transparency, and freedom of the press? Are there ethical red lines that must never be crossed, even during operations, even if it would be advantageous from an operational standpoint? I would now like to ask you a question that I often hear in conversations: If we adhere to democratic values, ethics, and morals, are we not always at a disadvantage compared to dictatorships and totalitarian regimes, where any means are justified to achieve the desired success?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: The use of operational communication tools is subject to the same international and constitutional requirements as the use of other military capabilities. We therefore see no specific conflict between operational communication and democratic values. Operational communication can potentially be used to influence the opinions of social groups in other countries.

However, influencing is only possible under certain conditions. One example is the approval of target groups – legal authorization is always required in advance. We also always keep ethics in mind when planning operational communication. In addition, we always consult our legal advisors to ensure that we do not make the wrong decision in an emergency. In Germany, we live in a constitutional state, which means that we are constitutionally bound to comply with the applicable law. I would therefore not speak of a disadvantage compared to a dictatorship. A dictatorship does not ensure that the rights and freedoms of its own people are protected by the state. The situation is different in Germany. And that is exactly what we stand for. Furthermore, I doubt that “any means” will lead to success, because the dissemination of deliberately false or ethically unacceptable information also means that you can lose credibility.

With the digital age, social media, and the ability to obtain and disseminate information in seconds on the internet, the situation for all types of communication has changed fundamentally. What role do social media play in modern conflict today — are they more of a tool or a battlefield? What are the advantages and disadvantages? Above all, how does AI with deepfakes, bots, and automated narratives specifically change operational communication?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: Social media are both a tool and a battlefield. It enables rapid situation assessments, direct communication with target groups, and counterarguments, but at the same time creates a highly dynamic environment for disinformation, mobilization, and escalation. Often, reach is more important than truth. The advantage is speed and the reach that it provides. The disadvantage, on the other hand, is the low controllability and high susceptibility to manipulation. AI enhances operational communication primarily through scaling and automation: deepfakes, bots, and automated narratives allow content to be disseminated en masse, targeted at specific audiences, and seemingly authentic. At the same time, the threshold for disinformation is significantly lowered, while verification and attribution—i.e., clearly identifying who is responsible for spreading the disinformation—become much more difficult.

Do you consider Germany, especially the media and society, to be sufficiently resilient to targeted disinformation campaigns? And how do you deal with the tension that “truth” often has less impact in the information space than emotionalization or disinformation?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: Complete social resilience will probably always remain a pipe dream. However, at least in the German Armed Forces, we are well on the way to equipping our soldiers to counter foreign disinformation. Since last year, we at ZOpKomBw have been training the resilience of our armed forces personnel specifically against foreign manipulation and influence. Our training always focuses on maintaining and strengthening operational value – in particular the morale of our soldiers. Operational communication always operates in a field of tension: truth alone does not automatically produce results. The task is therefore to present true content in a way that is appropriate for the target group and comprehensible, without crossing the line into deception. We are convinced that long-term impact is achieved above all through consistent credibility.

The best operational communication is the kind that no one notices, while the desired success is achieved. Efficient, elegant, and invisible. Can you give an example of how operational communication has contributed significantly to the success of a mission, and how do you adapt communication strategies to different cultural contexts and local narratives?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: The ZOpKomBw has participated in almost every Bundeswehr mission in recent decades. In times of crisis intervention missions, for example, we were successful in the Afghanistan mission with on-site support. There, we ensured a positive perception of the mission on the ground through a wide variety of operational communication products. This, and the high level of participation of our soldiers, shows that our range of tasks is of great importance in a military context. The ZOpKomBw has specialized regional teams in which, in addition to officers and staff officers, civilian regional scientists continuously observe and analyze the information environment of various regions of the world. This consistency enables our agency to build and maintain expertise and thus be “cold-start capable” when needed. Thanks to the continuous work of our regional teams, we have the ability to constantly adapt our own communication strategies to the respective target group. In our view, this is also a step that is always necessary.

Let's move from the fundamentals to Russia as an actor in the information space. These days, there is talk, in what I consider to be a somewhat trivializing manner, of an agreement with Russia on NATO's eastern flank in 2029. How do you assess Russia's current information and influence strategy toward Germany and Europe? Are we seeing individual disinformation campaigns or a long-term, strategic destabilization of our society, and what do you think Russia's primary goals are: political decision-making, social division, or a loss of trust in state institutions? Or even all of these at once?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: We currently assume that Russia's military capabilities will recover relatively quickly after the end of the war. This means that a military threat to the alliance will remain even after the end of the war against Ukraine. That is why the soldiers of the ZOpKomBw are focusing on NATO alliance defense scenarios and contributing to strengthening our NATO eastern flank. Russia is constantly trying to reach the German public through targeted disinformation campaigns in order to influence our society. These campaigns take place primarily in the digital space. An effective measure was therefore to block news sites and magazines such as Russia Today. These were financed by the Russian government to spread disinformation in our society. The block reduced the spread of disinformation. Our social cohesion is to be weakened by regularly recurring narratives in the context of the war against Ukraine, such as the portrayal of Western sanctions as the sole cause of economic problems or the targeted dissemination of contradictory versions of events. The aim of such campaigns is to erode trust in our democracy and reinforce existing social divisions. In our view, Russia is pursuing various political and strategic goals with its foreign communications. The most important of these are certainly the aforementioned weakening of social cohesion in Germany, but also the delegitimization of our democratically elected government and the discrediting of our aid to Ukraine.

Fake news and narratives: People no longer know who to believe. Much is being questioned. This fact alone is already a success for the destabilization mechanisms that are being brought into our society from outside. In some cases, political actors are joining in this chorus. Which narratives are particularly frequently used by Russian actors to destabilize democratic societies in the West, and why are false reports often more successful than fact-based communication? Do emotional triggers such as fear, anger, or hurt play a role in such campaigns?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: Russian influence campaigns use recurring narratives that portray Western democracies as weak or divided, while at the same time deliberately exacerbating existing social conflicts. Issues such as energy, migration, and gender equality policy are used as evidence of how socially damaging and morally corrupt the West allegedly is. Russia is presented as the alternative, where traditional values still apply. Fake news often has a stronger impact than fact-based communication because it emotionalizes, simplifies, and offers clear blame. Emotional triggers such as fear or anger significantly increase the spread of disinformation, and a society becomes particularly vulnerable where polarization and loss of trust already exist.

Where do you see the greatest vulnerabilities of German society to disinformation? And how dangerous is it when citizens fundamentally distrust state institutions—even when the information is correct?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: A general distrust of state institutions is particularly dangerous. Because when even accurate information is no longer believed, democratic discourse is permanently weakened.

Let's take a brief look at the role of the German Armed Forces and operational communication in the canon of “services.” A large part of society is familiar with the Federal and State Office for the Protection of the Constitution from media reports. The same applies to the Federal Intelligence Service – which people probably associate with James Bond adventures in their imagination, something that is currently still out of the question due to the legal situation. Very few German citizens are familiar with the Military Counter-Intelligence Service and the Bundeswehr's Center for Operational Communication. What role does the Bundeswehr play in dealing with foreign, especially Russian, disinformation campaigns – and where are clear boundaries deliberately drawn between it and the other services mentioned in Germany? How do you, as the Center for Operational Communication, work with other government actors without interfering in the formation of opinion within Germany, and how do you ensure that your countermeasures are not themselves perceived as propaganda?

Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: The ZOpKomBw is neither a domestic nor a foreign intelligence service, but has the clear mandate to contribute to the protection and maintenance of the operational capability of our armed forces. Our agency works across departments with other government actors, for example in the exchange of situation reports or in the coordination of strategic communication. At the same time, there is a clear constitutional limit: we do not interfere in domestic political opinion-forming and do not influence our own population. Transparency and legal compliance are crucial for credibility. Countermeasures must be fact-based, comprehensible, and proportionate. When communication is based on verifiable facts, the risk of being perceived as propaganda itself is reduced. Once again: we are convinced that long-term impact is achieved above all through consistent credibility.

Colonel, word has now spread that Russia is also making massive use of AI and deepfakes. Russia maintains permanent, organized digital influence structures that target Western democracies and societies. It is already doing so continuously in the information space – not only in crises or during war. These hybrid networks, also known as “bot armies,” consist, for example, of automated accounts (bots) and human actors who are woven into a network of government agencies, state-affiliated companies, and outsourced “content factories.”

How much does AI-generated content from Russia and similarly motivated states change the threat situation in the information space? What about targeted deepfake campaigns from Russia against political decision-makers or military leaders in Germany? Is our society technically and mentally prepared for a future in which visual evidence is no longer reliable?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: AI-generated content significantly exacerbates the threat situation in the information environment because it makes disinformation scalable, faster, more credible, and less expensive. What is decisive is not so much the technical perfection of individual deepfakes as their mass, accuracy, and proximity to political decision-making processes, which puts pressure on trust, decision-making, and social cohesion. In our view, deepfake campaigns can be expected at any time, especially in crises, election campaigns, or when sensitive security policy decisions are being made. Russian foreign media outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) are already discrediting political decision-makers such as Ursula von der Leyen and Volodymyr Zelensky with the help of deepfakes. The aim is to undermine their credibility. In my opinion, it is difficult to assess whether our society is prepared for this conflict scenario. Although detection and verification tools exist, they can only be used effectively with in-depth media literacy. In our view, the rapid development of AI has above all brought home the realization that we can no longer rely on supposed visual evidence and that the line between “real” and “AI-generated” is already virtually non-existent today.

We know that there is no such thing as 100% security. Instead, in many discussions on almost every topic, we hear that we need to be resilient. The difference between 100% security—all attacks are prevented—and resilience—attacks can be coped with—could not be more fundamental. My personal favorite image for this topic is as follows: The security family always wants to keep the front door locked. Resilient families, on the other hand, ensure that the house remains habitable if someone breaks in. What does “social resilience” mean in concrete terms from a military perspective? What role do media literacy and political education play in protecting against disinformation? How can the Bundeswehr provide support, where does state responsibility end – and where does the responsibility of each individual begin?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: From our point of view, social resilience means that our society does not lose its cohesion and question its democratic value system, even under the influence and manipulation attempts of foreign states. Resilience is therefore not aimed at preventing attacks, but at limiting their impact and maintaining trust in our state institutions and democracy. Media literacy and political education are key protective factors because they enable people to critically assess information, evaluate sources, and recognize attempts at manipulation. This is another reason why the ZOpKomBw provides the aforementioned resilience training within our armed forces. Both the population and the state share responsibility in the fight against disinformation. Resilience is therefore not only a task for the state as a whole, but also for society as a whole. The state is responsible for ensuring that the institutional and legal framework is in place, so that we have, for example, a free and professional media landscape. This in turn enables individual citizens to form their own informed opinions, critically examine information, and pass it on responsibly. Resilience arises from the interaction of both sides.

I simply have to ask: In your view, are we already in a permanent information conflict with Russia? If so, what form does this conflict take in concrete terms, which, in my opinion, is somewhat trivialized by being referred to as a “hybrid war”? What lessons is the German Armed Forces learning from Russia's information war in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and what should Germany do today to be less vulnerable to targeted disinformation from Russia when the “agreement on NATO's eastern flank in 2029” becomes acute?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, at the latest, we in Germany may not be at war, but we are also no longer in the state of peace that we have enjoyed over the past decades. For years, we have been experiencing a continuous conflict in the information environment that takes place below the threshold of open military conflict. This manifests itself in disinformation campaigns, influence on political debates, cyber operations, and targeted attempts to increase social division and undermine trust in institutions. The term “hybrid warfare” describes less a formal state of war than the systematic combination of military, political, economic, diplomatic, and informational means. A key lesson is that disinformation campaigns are not a side effect, but an integral part of Russian warfare. The impact of these campaigns extends throughout the entire course of the war – as well as in peacetime, i.e., even before kinetic operations. It is also clear that social resilience is a crucial factor in overall defense. Strengthening resilience against foreign disinformation is therefore the lever that, from our perspective, can have the greatest impact.

The last question: What do you say to people who refuse to acknowledge that we are already in a conflict with Russia in the here and now? People who claim that there is no evidence that Russia is behind many of the activities we have described in the course of this interview? People who claim that Russia has been attacked and is only defending itself? People who claim that it is just our propaganda to portray Russia as the culprit?

Colonel Dr. Ferdi Akaltin: First, I would acknowledge that critical questioning is legitimate and even necessary in a democracy. At the same time, The assessment that we are in an ongoing conflict with Russia in the information environment is not based on opinions, but on publicly documented analyses by security agencies, international partners, and independent research institutes. For example, the European Union publishes its so-called FIMI report once a year, which specifically lists how Russia—and China—manipulate opinions and attempt to influence the West. The portrayal that Russia has been attacked and is acting solely defensively contradicts the international legal assessment of the 2022 attack on Ukraine, which is widely regarded internationally as a violation of the UN Charter's prohibition of the use of force. This assessment is not propaganda, but a legally and politically established classification based on international norms. Finally, the reference to “our propaganda” shows how strongly information conflicts target trust. This is precisely why transparency and reliable source work are crucial. A democracy must be able to withstand criticism – but it must not relativize verifiable facts and, above all, it must not be defenseless in the fight against disinformation.